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ABSTRACT 
We study how government green procurement policies influence private-sector 
demand for similar products. Specifically, we measure the impact of municipal 
policies requiring governments to construct green buildings on private-sector 
adoption of the US Green Building Council's Leadership in Energy and 
Environmental Design (LEED) standard. Using matching methods, panel data, 
and instrumental variables, we find that government procurement rules produce 
spillover effects that stimulate both private-sector adoption of the LEED standard 
and investments in green building expertise by local suppliers. These findings 
suggest that government procurement policies can accelerate the diffusion of new 
environmental standards that require coordinated complementary investments by 
various types of private adopter. 
 
JEL Codes: L15, Q58, Q55, O33.  
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Governments often use their formidable purchasing power to promote environmental 
policy objectives. The US Environmental Protection Agency and the European Union, for 
example, have developed environmentally preferable purchasing guidelines for goods ranging 
from paint, paper, and cleaning supplies to lumber and electricity. Various state and local 
governments have taken similar steps.
1 These procurement policies often have the stated goals of 
encouraging cost-reducing innovation among suppliers and spurring private demand for green 
products (Brander et al. 2003; Marron 2003). The European Union, for example, justifies its 
environmental procurement policy not only on the basis of leveraging government demand to 
“create or enlarge markets for environmentally friendly products and services” but also on the 
basis of stimulating “the use of green standards in private procurement” (Commission of the 
European Communities 2008: 2). To date, there has been little evidence on whether these 
targeted government procurement policies produce the intended spillover effects. This paper 
provides some initial evidence by measuring the impact of municipal green building procurement 
policies on the private-sector adoption of green building standards. 
  We examine whether green building requirements that apply only to municipal buildings 
accelerate the use of green building practices by private-sector developers in the same 
geographic markets, as manifested by more rapid diffusion of the US Green Building Council’s 
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) standard for sustainable building 
practices. Our results show that the LEED standard diffuses more quickly among private-sector 
developers in cities that adopt a government green building procurement policy, as compared to 
a matched sample of non-adopting cities of similar size, demographics, and environmental 
preferences. We also find that government green procurement policies are associated with the 
growth of green building input markets, as measured by the number of local architects, 
                                                 
1 Many authors have discussed government procurement as a policy instrument. For example, see Johnstone (2003), Coggburn 
and Rahm (2005), Commission of the European Communities (2008), Michelsen and de Boer (2009), and National Association 
of State Procurement Officials and Responsible Purchasing Network (2010). For examples related to green procurement policies, 
see Clinton (1998), Commission of the European Communities (2008), Environmental Law Institute (2008), Patrick (2009), 
Rainwater (2009), National Association of State Procurement Officials (2010), and United Kingdom Office of Government 
Commerce (2010).   2
contractors, and other real estate industry professionals who obtain the LEED Accredited 
Professional designation. Finally, we show that green building procurement policies produce 
geographic spillovers. In particular, there is more LEED adoption by developers and real estate 
industry professionals in “neighbor cities”—those bordering a city that has adopted a green 
building policy—than among these neighboring cities’ own set of matched controls.  
The paper considers three mechanisms by which municipal green procurement policies 
could promote diffusion of the LEED standard within the private sector. First, government 
procurement policies might stimulate local demand for green buildings by raising awareness of 
buildings’ impact on the environment or legitimating a particular standard for measuring green 
building performance. Second, government procurement policies might lead to lower prices for 
green building inputs through some combination of increased entry by new suppliers, scale 
economies, and learning effects. And third, government procurement policies might solve a 
coordination problem in the market for green buildings. Specifically, if developers are waiting 
for key suppliers to invest in green building expertise, while those same suppliers are waiting for 
evidence of ample demand, municipal government procurement policies might jump-start the 
development of specialized input markets by providing a guaranteed source of demand for 
LEED-accredited professionals and other suppliers. 
While these three mechanisms are not mutually exclusive, our analysis suggests that 
green building procurement policies promote entry by input suppliers, thereby helping to solve 
coordination problems associated with joint adoption. In particular, we find no evidence that 
procurement policies had a larger impact in “greener” cities, which would have supported the 
theory that procurement policies increase awareness of the LEED standard, and would therefore 
produce a larger response in markets with greater latent demand for green buildings. We also 
find that procurement policy impacts are, if anything, somewhat larger in large municipalities. 
This contradicts the hypothesis that procurement policies cause incumbent green building input 
suppliers to reduce prices in response to learning, scale economies, or increased competition,   3
since we would expect these effects to be stronger in small markets where competition is weak 
and suppliers have not reached efficient scale.  
This leaves entry by new suppliers and solving coordination problems as two possible 
explanations for the spillovers we observe. We find that more new suppliers enter (by obtaining 
LEED accreditation) in markets where there is a local green building procurement policy. While 
we do not provide a direct test of the coordination hypothesis, the final step in our analysis uses 
instrumental variables to measure the causal impact of the supply of LEED Accredited 
Professionals on private developers’ LEED adoption rates and vice versa. There can only be 
coordination failures in LEED adoption if both effects are positive, which we find to be the 
case.
2 Overall, our findings suggest that government purchasing policies can break deadlocks 
that emerge when coordinated investments are required to adopt a common standard, thereby 
stimulating the growth of private markets for the targeted goods and services.  
Related literature. This study contributes to four broad literature streams. First, we add to 
a nascent literature that characterizes how governments are increasingly incorporating 
environmental criteria into their procurement policies. Much of this work is descriptive. For 
example, Coggburn and Rahm (2005) and May and Koski (2007) describe the emergence of 
green building procurement policies within the US federal and state governments. McCrudden 
(2004) provides an historical context by recounting how governments have used procurement 
policies to promote a host of social objectives. Michelsen and de Boer (2009) and Sourani and 
Sohail (2011) identify both the barriers to implementing green building procurement policies and 
the capabilities that can overcome those barriers. Marron (1997) and Marron (2003) describe the 
potential impacts of government green procurement policies.   
We also contribute to a literature that examines the adoption and impact of green building 
practices. Kahn and Vaughn (2009) show that LEED certification and Toyota Prius ownership 
                                                 
2 To estimate the impact of an increase in the number of LEED Accredited Professionals on private developers’ LEED adoption 
rates, we use green building policy adoption in distant cities as an instrument for the number of LEED Accredited Professionals 
in nearby cities. To show that private developers’ LEED adoption rates cause an increase in the supply of LEED Accredited 
Professionals, we use new construction starts (conditional on city size) to instrument for the level of LEED adoption.   4
were highly concentrated in wealthy coastal areas. Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley (2010) provide 
the first large-scale evidence of private benefits from green building, using building-level data to 
show that green-certified properties have higher rents and occupancy rates than comparable 
noncertified properties in the same neighborhood. Kok and Jennen (2012) report similar results. 
Kok, McGraw, and Quigley (2011) reveal a positive association between the number of LEED 
Accredited Professionals and the growth rate of LEED certification. 
Unlike prior studies of LEED diffusion, our research emphasizes spillovers from public 
procurement rules to private adoption. Choi (2010) finds greater commercial LEED adoption in 
cities with municipal policies that provide formal administrative benefits for green building 
proposals (such as quicker review cycles) or that require commercial buildings to incorporate 
green features. We provide evidence of spillover effects on private real estate development even 
when municipal green building procurement policies do not provide explicit rules or incentives 
to encourage private adoption. 
Our study also contributes to the literature on quality certification. While this literature 
typically emphasizes information problems (see Dranove and Jin (2010) for a review), we focus 
on the role of network effects in the diffusion of a new standard. When the success of a new 
quality standard depends on many different actors (such as producers, wholesalers, retailers, and 
customers), certification programs will resemble a multisided platform, with adoption by one 
group conferring an externality on the others. Farrell and Saloner (1986) model technology 
adoption in the presence of network effects and coin the term “excess inertia” to describe the 
familiar chicken-and-egg coordination problem whereby each side waits for the others to adopt. 
Corts (2010) applies a two-sided platform perspective to study the diffusion of alternative fuels 
and shows that government procurement of “flex fuel” vehicles that run on both gasoline and 
ethanol led to increased supply of ethanol at local filling stations. We follow Corts by measuring 
the impact of government procurement policies on the supply of complements, which in our 
setting is the number of LEED-accredited professionals. We extend his analysis by measuring   5
the “same-side” externalities (that is, the impact of government procurement policies on private 
LEED adoption) and by evaluating a broader range of potential mechanisms.
3  
Finally, our examination of the efficacy of government procurement contributes to a 
growing literature evaluating alternative regulatory approaches such as government voluntary 
programs (Toffel and Short 2011), voluntary agreements (Delmas and Montes-Sancho 2010), 
and mandatory information disclosure programs such as restaurant hygiene grade cards (Jin and 
Leslie 2003).
4 With procurement becoming an increasingly popular policy instrument in Europe 
(Commission of the European Communities 2008) and in the United States (National 
Association of State Procurement Officials and Responsible Purchasing Network 2010), our 
research confirms the promise of this approach, at least in the context of green building.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section I outlines a simple framework for 
analyzing the impact of green building procurement policies on the private sector and describes 
the LEED green building standard. Section II describes our data, measures, and empirical 
methods. Section III describes the empirical results. Section IV offers concluding remarks. 
I. Public Procurement and Environmental Standards: Theory and Institutions 
A. Procurement Spillovers in Theory 
Government purchasing guidelines often use price preferences or quantity targets to 
reward products that meet environmental criteria such as incorporating recycled content, 
exhibiting pollution levels below regulatory limits, or exceeding voluntary energy-efficiency 
standards. These policies can significantly boost demand for the targeted products and services 
through the government’s own procurement decisions, especially when the government is a 
major customer.  However, the impact may extend beyond this direct effect, depending on how 
government purchasing interacts with private-sector demand. Governments often try to design 
policies that will “influence the behavior of other socio-economic actors by setting the example, 
                                                 
3 From the literature on multisided platforms, we borrow the “same side” terminology to denote an externality between two 
groups of users that do not transact with one another but typically use a standard or platform in a similar way (see Rysman 2009). 
4 For a review of this literature, see Doshi, Dowell, and Toffel (2013).   6
and by sending clear signals to the market-place” (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 2000: 20). 
In principle, government procurement policies can influence private-sector purchasing 
through supply channels, demand channels, or both. Moreover, the private-sector response to a 
government green purchasing policy might either reinforce or counteract that policy’s direct 
impacts.  
Supply channels. On the supply side, government green procurement policies may 
stimulate private-sector demand for the targeted products and services if increased government 
purchasing reduces suppliers’ average costs; for example, when there are significant scale 
economies or learning-curve effects in key input markets.
5 When suppliers’ fixed costs are large 
relative to the size of the market, government purchases might also spur entry, leading to more 
competition and lower prices.  
An alternative theory of positive procurement spillovers is that explicit government 
preference for a particular product or standard will help private market participants overcome 
excess inertia in the adoption process. By stimulating the supply of goods that meet a particular 
standard, government demand can provide a focal point for private demand. This theory assumes 
that private suppliers and customers will not independently adopt a common standard in order to 
realize the benefits of a more coordinated supply chain, perhaps because of the risk that prior 
investments in specific standards will be stranded or underutilized.
6 One example of using 
government policy to overcome this type of coordination failure is the US Department of 
Agriculture’s organic certification program, which was developed partly in response to concerns 
that farmers and consumers were confused by a proliferation of competing private organic labels 
and could not coordinate on a common standard (Fetter and Caswell 2002).  
                                                 
5 For instance, many military technologies require substantial up-front R&D expenditures and rely on the scale economies 
produced by military procurement programs to reach cost levels that are suitable for civilian application. This theory is closely 
related to the “induced innovation” hypothesis that procurement preferences lead to increased competition and innovation on the 
targeted product or service attributes. For example, Siemens (2003) suggests that a preference for the Energy Star label in 
government computer purchasing led to increased innovation in energy-efficient electronics.  
6 Rochet and Tirole (2006) show that a similar coordination failure is the central assumption in the literature on multisided 
platforms.   7
In principle, government procurement policies could also have negative spillovers that 
stifle private consumption. When supply is inelastic, for example, government procurement 
might crowd out private purchases of the targeted goods (Marron 1997).
7 Alternatively, if 
procurement rules define a sharp cutoff between green and brown products, the private supply of 
environmental goods might become concentrated just above the green-compliance threshold. If 
some suppliers would have produced greener products in the absence of a sharp cutoff, then 
environmental procurement rules could actually reduce the supply of green goods, even if they 
do increase private purchasing of green products.
8 
Demand channels.  Government procurement policies might also produce a shift in the 
private demand curve, as opposed to movement along it. For example, procurement policies 
could increase the visibility or credibility of a green product (or label) to private consumers, 
especially when consumers are unable to evaluate claimed environmental benefits on their own. 
Put differently, procurement policies might unleash latent demand for green goods simply by 
raising consumer awareness. We expect these information-based demand-side effects to be most 
salient when the green product or label has minimal market share and little consumer awareness 
prior to the government’s adoption of the procurement policy.  
Government procurement rules could also influence private demand by altering the 
weight that consumers attach to specific policy priorities. For instance, a government could 
exercise moral suasion, leading private firms and consumers to follow its purchasing guidelines, 
especially if those parties are already favorably disposed towards the underlying policy goals. On 
the other hand, public procurement might crowd out private demand if consumers come to 
perceive that the public sector is already “doing enough” to support those same goals.   
                                                 
7 While we could find no clear examples of crowding out in green procurement, there is some evidence that the supply of green 
power is inelastic, so government subsidies for green electricity are primarily spent on marketing and advertising these higher-
priced services to end consumers rather than investing in new-generation facilities (Rader 1998). 
8 This seems especially likely when procurement policies are based on voluntary standards developed by firms with strong 
incentives to preempt more stringent regulation (Lyon and Maxwell 1999; King and Lenox 2000; Reid and Toffel 2009). 
Interestingly, this suggests that government purchasing policies should sometimes avoid specifying particular private standards, 
especially when there are questions about the motives of the developers of those standards or about the stringency of the private 
certification.    8
Government green building procurement policies.  In practice, the importance of any 
supply- or demand-side channel depends on specific features of that product’s market. There are 
several reasons to expect that, in our analysis, private demand will respond positively to 
government green building procurement policies. First, government is an especially large 
customer in the real estate market. According to Marron (2003), 26 percent of all spending on 
“maintenance and repair construction” comes from federal, state, and local government.
9 Second, 
builders can realize direct benefits from green investments that produce energy savings or that 
increase tenants’ willingness to pay (Eichholtz, Kok, and Quigley 2010). Third, our analysis 
covers a period when LEED was just emerging as the dominant standard for green building 
certification, so government procurement policies could plausibly jump-start key input markets if 
suppliers were waiting for private developers to commit to a standard. While each of these 
factors suggests that we should observe a positive correlation between government green 
building procurement policies and private-sector green building certification, they also suggest 
that we should be cautious about extrapolating our findings to settings in which the government’s 
share of purchases is small, there are few direct benefits of investment, and standards and 
technologies are already mature.  
B. LEED Certification and Accreditation 
LEED is a green building certification program developed and administered by the 
nonprofit US Green Building Council (USGBC). Started in 1998, LEED initially focused on 
rating the environmental attributes of new construction and has since added rating schemes for 
commercial and retail interior design, residences, neighborhoods, and building renovation. 
Federal, state, and local governments have been significant LEED adopters since the program 
began. 
LEED awards points for incorporating specific design elements or meeting environmental 
                                                 
9 The munitions industry is the only case in which government purchasing represents a larger share of total expenditures.   9
performance targets in eight categories.
10 More total points qualify projects for increasingly 
prestigious certification levels: certified, silver, gold, and platinum.  
The LEED certification process begins with the developer registering a project with 
USGBC. Registration “serves as a declaration of intent to certify” the building, provides the 
developer access to LEED information and tools, and lists the project in the publicly available 
online LEED project database (Green Building Certification Institute 2011). Once the 
construction or renovations have been completed and the certification application has been 
approved, the applicant is sent a plaque (often displayed in the lobby in commercial buildings) 
and the project is included in the online LEED database of certified projects.  
The cost of adopting the building practices necessary to obtain LEED certification varies 
with the type and scale of the project and with the certification level. Costs can accrue from 
coordinating the required design elements and from using more expensive materials and 
technologies. The activities required to obtain LEED points range from relatively cheap (such as 
installing bike racks) to quite expensive (such as remediating a brownfield site). The 
administrative costs of LEED certification are small by comparison: roughly $450-600 to register 
a project with USGBC and a certification fee of $2,000. Estimates of the non-construction-and-
materials marginal costs of LEED (“soft costs” that mainly comprise additional design and 
documentation) range from $0.41 to $0.80 per gross square foot (GSF), or roughly $30,000 for 
the median project in our sample of LEED buildings.
11 
The benefits of LEED can include increased rents and occupancy rates and reduced 
operating costs. Several studies have found that LEED-certified buildings charge a three-to-five-
percent rent premium and have higher sale prices and occupancy rates (Eichholtz, Kok, and 
Quigley 2010, 2013; Fuerst and McAllister 2011a, 2011b; Chegut, Eichholtz, and Kok 2013). 
                                                 
10 The eight LEED categories are: location and planning, sustainable sites, water efficiency, energy and atmosphere, materials 
and resources, indoor environmental quality, innovation and design, and regional priority. 
11 Estimates of soft costs were obtained from the “LEED Cost Study” commissioned by the US General Services Administration 
(Contract No. GS–11P–99–MAD–0565, p. 187). Our $30,000 estimate is simply the midpoint of the GSA range ($0.60/GSF) 
multiplied by 50,000 GSF, which is roughly the median size of a LEED project (the mean project is 216,000 GSF).   10
Evidence of reduced operating costs is mixed, however, in part because LEED certification 
emphasizes design elements rather than energy consumption. Nevertheless, several engineering 
studies do suggest that LEED certification is correlated with increased energy efficiency (Turner 
and Frankel 2008; Newsham, Mancini, and Birt 2009; Sabapathy et al. 2010).
12  
Given the potential costs and complexity of adopting the LEED standard, the USGBC 
also created a program to educate and certify real estate industry professionals in its application. 
To become a LEED Accredited Professional, an individual must pass an exam demonstrating 
deep knowledge about green buildings in general and the LEED standard in particular.
13 LEED 
Accredited Professionals come from a variety of occupational categories—including architects, 
engineers, and project managers—as illustrated in Figure 1.
14 
C. Empirical Roadmap 
Our analysis of LEED diffusion builds on the idea that the standard resembles a 
multisided platform that facilitates interactions among real estate developers and suppliers of 
green building inputs. Thus, our first set of empirical results measures the strength of same-side 
spillovers in LEED adoption between private developers and government. Specifically, we find a 
positive relationship between the adoption of government green building procurement policies 
and the number of LEED-registered private-sector buildings. This relationship could exist for a 
variety of reasons, including demonstration effects, moral suasion, scale economies, learning 
effects, anticipation of regulatory changes, or a positive correlation between policies and 
preferential treatment of green buildings in the municipal permitting process. We conduct several 
analyses to test these explanations, such as examining whether green building procurement 
policies have a greater impact in larger cities or in greener cities. We also estimate the policies’ 
                                                 
12 For example, engineering estimates from a study of 121 LEED-certified projects that volunteered data on energy use suggest 
that these buildings consume 25-30 percent less energy than the national average for comparable projects (Turner and Frankel 
2008), though other observers have raised concerns that some LEED-certified buildings do not deliver energy savings (Navarro 
2009). 
13 In 2004, it cost roughly $350 to take the LEED Accredited Professional exam. It is hard to assess the opportunity costs of 
preparation, but one website (www.leeduser.com/) suggests taking a test-prep course and studying an additional 20 hours.   
14 Future research could explore the diffusion and agglomeration of different types of human capital that acquire LEED expertise 
and how this might differentially affect the diffusion of LEED certified buildings.   11
impact on private-sector LEED registration rates in neighboring non-adopting cities, where 
private developers could benefit from geographic spillovers produced by a nearby green building 
policy.  This neighbor city analysis compares LEED registration rates in cities adjacent to green 
building procurement policy adopters with registration rates in these neighbors’ own set of 
matched control cities. The neighboring city analysis also provides a larger and more 
representative sample of “treated” municipalities, and helps to address lingering concerns about 
other omitted variables, such as green preferences in the permitting process, that could be 
correlated with both policy adoption and private-sector LEED building.  
Our second set of empirical results measures the strength of “cross-side” spillovers in 
LEED adoption between developers and building-industry professionals.
15 For any platform, a 
larger installed base on one side should generate an increased supply of complements on other 
sides. We show that government green building procurement policies stimulate investment in 
green building expertise among local real estate industry professionals (measured as the number 
of LEED Accredited Professionals). Because the market for real estate professionals often 
extends beyond city borders, we also examine the impact of green building procurement policies 
on the supply of LEED Accredited Professionals who work in neighboring cities. This analysis 
reveals that green building policies increase the supply of green building professionals beyond 
the policy adopter’s city limits. Thus, our results suggest that LEED Accredited Professionals are 
a key transmission mechanism for geographic spillovers of green procurement policies. 
In principle, professional service providers might invest in green building know-how 
without any government encouragement or formal certification program if they expected such 
human capital to be rewarded in the marketplace. However, uncertainty about whether and how 
the market will observe, measure, and reward green building expertise creates a possibility of 
stranded investment and thus an opportunity for government policies to solve the resulting 
coordination problem. Moreover, although our cross-side spillover results focus on LEED 
                                                 
15 In the literature on multisided platforms, a “cross-side effect” is a positive externality between two groups that use a platform 
to interact with one another. In the literature on network effects, video game players and developers is a leading example.    12
Accredited Professionals, government green building procurement policies could jump-start 
many other complementary input markets. For instance, producers and local distributors of 
building materials might be more likely to carry products that meet LEED criteria after a green 
building procurement policy is adopted. Viewing the number of LEED Accredited Professionals 
as a proxy for a host of specialized green inputs helps clarify why developers might be slow to 
adopt LEED even if they believe there is latent demand for green buildings: The cumulative 
expense of being a green first-mover could be large, even if contractors and architects constitute 
a small share of total construction costs.  
In our final set of analyses, we switch from measuring the reduced-form impacts of 
government green procurement policies to measuring the structural links between each side of 
the LEED platform. In particular, we estimate the causal impact of the number of LEED 
Accredited Professionals on private-sector LEED registrations by using “distant” green 
procurement policies as an instrumental variable. The key maintained assumption in this analysis 
is that municipal green procurement policies in far-away cities increase the supply of LEED 
Accredited Professionals in nearby markets, but otherwise have nothing to do with the decisions 
of private developers in a focal market to adopt LEED. To estimate the causal impact of LEED 
registrations on LEED Accredited Professionals, we use the number of new buildings 
constructed between 2003 and 2007 (conditional on city size) as an instrument for registrations. 
We find that both of these structural relationships are positive and somewhat larger than the 
reduced-form relationships, which supports the theory that government procurement policies 
promote LEED diffusion by helping real estate developers and building-industry professionals 
overcome excess inertia in the early stages of adoption.   
II. Data and Measures 
Our analysis uses data on 735 California cities from 2001 to 2008. We selected California 
because it is the state with the largest number of municipal green building policies and it also has   13
many cities that had not adopted such policies during our sample period. Our dataset combines 
information from a variety of sources. We obtained LEED diffusion data from the USGBC, data 
on nonresidential construction starts from McGraw Hill, and city-level demographic data from 
the US Census. We hand-collected data on the municipal adoption of green building policies. 
Summary statistics are presented in Table 1. The unit of analysis is a city (or city-year), which 
we defined as a Census Place, the geographical unit with available Census demographics and 
voting-records data that most closely resembles the political unit of a municipality.  
LEED registrations. We measure private-sector and public-sector LEED diffusion via 
LEED registration data obtained from the USGBC. Annual Private LEED Registrations is a 
count of new privately owned nonresidential or multi-unit residential buildings that were 
registered for LEED certification in a given year;
16 it reflects private-sector developers’ intention 
to use green building practices.
17 This total ranged from 0 to 52 across all the city-years in our 
sample (which excludes Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, and San Jose)
18 and averaged 
1.32 per city-year during our sample period. Total Private LEED Registrations is the total 
(cumulative) number of Annual Private LEED Registrations for each city during our sample 
period of 2001 to 2008. This total ranged from 0 to 87 across all the cities in our sample and 
averaged 1.64 per city during our sample period. To be clear, it is possible that developers adopt 
green building practices without obtaining LEED certification. However, given the small 
marginal costs of certification (conditional on building green) and the evidence that certification 
is associated with increased rent and occupancy rates, we expect that most qualifying structures 
actually do seek certification.  
                                                 
16 We include registrations pertaining to any version of the LEED standard, including those for new construction (LEED-NC), for 
commercial interiors (LEED-CI), and for a building's core and shell (LEED-CS).  
17 LEED registration is only the first step towards certification. The USGBC encourages projects to register early, since many 
decisions that will influence certification levels must be taken in the early stages of development. Because the lag from 
registration to certification can be several years and the LEED standard was diffusing rapidly toward the end of our sample 
period, a count of certified buildings would have excluded a large number of the projects in our dataset. For the buildings for 
which we have certification data, the average lag between registration and certification is between two and three years. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that few registered buildings fail to certify at some level.  
18 We exclude the four largest cities in California when calculating these summary statistics, since they (a) could not be matched 
for the analysis below and (b) tend to distort the sample averages due to their extreme size.    14
LEED Accredited Professionals. Our second outcome measure captures LEED-specific 
human capital investments by local real estate professionals. Annual  LEED Accredited 
Professionals is the number of building industry professionals (such as architects, contractors, 
and consultants) who passed the USGBC’s LEED accreditation exam in a given year. We 
obtained the city locations of LEED Accredited Professionals from their business addresses 
maintained in the USGBC directory of LEED Accredited Professionals. Total LEED Accredited 
Professionals is the total (cumulative) number of Annual LEED Accredited Professionals during 
2001 to 2008; that is, the number of professionals in a city that had become LEED Accredited 
Professionals during this eight-year period.  By 2008, there were between 0 and 416 such 
professionals in each city in our estimation sample, with an average of 7.5 per city. 
Government procurement policies. Our main explanatory variables indicate whether or 
not a focal city (or a “neighbor city” bordering a focal city) had, by the current calendar year, 
adopted a municipal green building policy targeting only government buildings. We gathered 
this policy information by hand, starting from lists compiled by the USGBC and by the Database 
of State Incentives for Renewables and Efficiency (DSIRE), funded by the US Department of 
Energy.
19 We identified 155 US cities (40 in California) that had adopted some type of green 
building ordinance by 2008.  (The California green building policy adopter cities in our sample 
are listed in Appendix Table A-1.) The sample ends in 2008 because of increased regulation of 
private green building practices—including California’s statewide Green Building Policy, which 
went into effect in August 2009—and because of data availability. 
Municipal green building policies vary along several dimensions, including the types of 
structure affected (by size, owner, and use); whether they cover only new buildings or also 
renovations; and how they measure environmental performance.
20 We gathered details on each 
                                                 
19 We acknowledge the excellent research assistance provided by Mark Stout. The DSIRE list of state and local incentives is 
available at http://www.dsireusa.org/ and the USGBC list can be found at 
http://www.usgbc.org/PublicPolicy/SearchPublicPolicies.aspx?PageID=1776. 
20 For example, the policy adopted by Irvine, CA in 2005 required new public construction over 5000 square feet to become 
LEED certified, while the policy adopted by Santa Cruz in the same year had no size threshold and required buildings to achieve 
a LEED silver certification. While our database is too small to explore the potential for heterogeneous treatment effects based on   15
policy from city websites and the online library of municipal codes.
21 Our research indicates that 
87 percent of all green building polices contained a purchasing rule—that is, a requirement that 
new public projects adhere to some type of environmental standard—and that 90 percent of these 
rules specified the LEED standard. Most policies in our sample apply to new construction and do 
not require buildings rented by municipalities to be certified as green.   
We create a time-invariant indicator variable, Green Policy Adopter, that equals 1 if a 
city had adopted a green procurement policy by 2008 and equals 0 otherwise. For cross-sectional 
models, we create a time-invariant variable, Exposure to Policy, to denote the total number of 
years that had elapsed by 2008 since a city had adopted a policy; it is coded 0 for cities that did 
not adopt a policy. For panel data models, we create a time-varying indicator variable, City 
Adopted Green Policy, coded 1 starting the year a city adopted a green procurement policy and 0 
before that (and always coded 0 for cities that did not adopt such a policy during our sample 
period). We also create Years Since City Adopted Green Policy to count the years since adoption; 
this, too, was always coded 0 for non-adopting cities. Similarly, for the neighboring city analysis, 
we create (a) a time-invariant indicator, Green Policy Adopter Neighbor, coded 1 for cities that 
had not adopted a green procurement policy but bordered a city that had done so by 2008, and 
coded 0 otherwise; (b) a time-varying indictor, Neighbor Adopted Green Policy, coded 1 for 
cities that had not adopted a green procurement policy but bordered a city that had done so by the 
focal year, and coded 0 otherwise; (c) Years Since Neighbor Adopted Green Policy to count the 
years since a neighbor city adopted a policy and coded 0 in pre-adoption years and for cities that 
did not neighbor a policy-adopting city;
22 and (d) Exposure to Neighbor’s Policy, which denotes 
the number of years that had elapsed by 2008 since a neighbor city adopted a policy and is coded 
0 for cities that did not border a policy-adopting city. Four percent of the cities in our estimation 
                                                                                                                                                             
different policy features, future research could attempt such analysis.  
21 Available at www.municode.com. 
22 Seven California municipalities had green building policies that imposed green building mandates on private-sector 
development in addition to mandates on government buildings. We exclude these seven cities from our analysis of Green Policy 
Adopter cities, but treat them as green building procurement policy adopters when analyzing Green Policy Adopter Neighbor 
cities.   16
sample had adopted a municipal green building policy by 2008 and 15 percent of the cities in our 
sample are green policy adopter neighbors.
23  
Construction activity. To control for variation in the underlying rate of new building 
activity, we purchased quarterly data on new building starts from McGraw Hill’s Dodge 
Construction Reports between 2003 and 2007.
24 The control variable Annual New Buildings is 
the annual number of nonresidential construction starts in each city. For periods for which we do 
not have data on new construction starts, we extrapolate based on the nearest six 
preceding/following quarters of new construction starts. Total New Buildings is the cumulative 
count of nonresidential construction starts between 2003 and 2007. The mean number of Total 
New Buildings for a city in our estimation sample was 26.21. Since the Total New Buildings 
variable is highly skewed and strongly correlated with population (ρ = 0.88), we also calculated 
the number of Total New Buildings per Capita (measured in buildings per 10,000 residents), 
which has a mean of 12.06 in our sample.  
Demographics. For each city in the analysis, we obtained Population (measured in units 
of 10,000), Income (median household income in $10,000s), and College (the share of adults 
with some college education) at the Census-Place level from the 2000 US Census. To create a 
proxy for white color employment, we aggregated the employment of all establishments in the 
finance, insurance, and real estate (FIRE) industries in 2001 from the National Establishment 
Time Series (NETS) database, a compendium of Dun & Bradstreet data, to create FIRE 
employment.  
Environmental preferences. We collected several measures of the prevailing preference 
for environmental sustainability in each city. First, we gathered data from the University of 
California’s Statewide Database (http://swdb.berkeley.edu/) and calculated Green Ballot Share 
as the proportion of each city’s citizens in favor of various statewide environmental ballot 
                                                 
23 While our matching procedure (described below) excludes Los Angeles, San Francisco, San Diego, and San Jose from the 
analysis of procurement policy adopters, each of these cities did in fact adopt a green building procurement policy and we treat 
them as policy adopters in the neighbor city analysis. 
24 We could only afford to procure five years of building-level construction starts data for California.   17
initiatives addressing environmental quality during 1996-2000 (Kahn 2002; Wu and Cutter 
2011). These ballot initiatives received support from an average of 61 percent of each city’s 
citizenry.  
Second, we obtained data on green purchasing behaviors by calculating the proportion of 
vehicles registered in 2008 that were Toyota Priuses, based on ZIP-code-level vehicle 
registration data from RL Polk (Kahn and Vaughn 2009; Kahn 2011). We aggregated these 
registration data to the city level to reflect the Prius market share in each city, creating the 
variable Prius Share, which has a mean of 0.54 percent.
25 From the Environment California 
Research and Policy Center, we collected data on the number of residential, commercial, and 
government solar installations in each city completed by 2006, creating the variable Solar 
Projects.
26 We created Alternative Fuel Stations, the number of alternative-fuel filling stations in 
each city in 2003, from the US Department of Energy Alternative Fuels Data Center.
27  
Finally, using data from the League of Conservation Voters (LCV), we calculated the 
proportion of pro-environment votes on environment-related bills cast by each city’s delegates to 
the State of California’s Senate and Assembly. These variables, LCV Senate Score and LCV 
Assembly Score, range from 0 (for cities whose delegates voted against all environment-related 
bills) to 100 (for cities whose delegates voted in favor of all such bills), with an average near 50 
for both the Assembly and the Senate across all cities in our estimation sample.
28   
III. Analysis and Results  
A. Matching and Balance 
To estimate the causal impact of government green building procurement policies on 
private-sector LEED registrations and LEED Accredited Professionals, we construct a matched 
                                                 
25 The highest Prius registration rate is 3.74 percent in Portola Valley (just west of Palo Alto). 
26 The raw data on solar projects is found in the public report available at 
http://www.environmentcalifornia.org/sites/environment/files/reports/California's%20Solar%20Cities%202012%20-
%20Final.pdf. 
27 http://www.afdc.energy.gov/. 
28 We use scores from 2001 in our cross-sectional models and annual values in our panel models.   18
control sample using the coarsened exact matching (CEM) procedure developed by Iacus, King, 
and Porro (2011, 2012). This method assumes selection on observables. That is, after matching 
and reweighting the data to account for the joint distribution of observed exogenous variables, 
we assume that adoption of a green building procurement policy by a city (or its neighbor) is 
uncorrelated with all other factors that influence private-sector LEED adoption. Intuitively, CEM 
is a method of preprocessing a dataset before running a weighted least-squares regression and it 
resembles propensity score methods in its use of matching, sampling weights, and balancing 
tests.
29 
To implement CEM, one begins by selecting a set of variables on which to match,   
“coarsening” (discretizing) any continuous variables in the set, and creating a group of “cells” 
corresponding to all possible combinations of values of the coarsened variables.
30 The set of 
matching variables and cut points are chosen by the analyst to balance a tradeoff between bias 
and variance. Adding variables and cut points leads to closer matches in the values of the 
continuous variables, but also discards more data.  The next step in the CEM process is to 
discard observations from any cell that does not contain both treated and control observations. 
Finally, a weight of 1 is assigned to each treated unit and a weight of Ti/Ci is assigned to each 
control observation in cell i (where Ti and Ci are the number of treatment and control 
observations, respectively). Weighted least-squares estimation then yields an estimate of the 
treatment effect for treated cities remaining in the estimation sample. 
Iacus, King, and Porro (2012) describe several advantages of CEM over the propensity 
score and other matching techniques. Unlike conventional regression control methods, CEM 
does not extrapolate counterfactual outcomes to regions of the parameter space where there are 
no data on controls. Because CEM is nonparametric, there is no possibility that a misspecified 
model of selection will produce greater imbalance in variables that are omitted from the 
                                                 
29 Step-by-step guidance on implementing coarsened exact matching is provided in Blackwell et al. (2009). 
30 Thus, if there are K matching variables and each (coarsened) variable has Lk possible values, the number of unique cells (prior 
to discarding any cells that contain no matches) will be L1 x L2 x L3 x … x LK.   19
matching procedure, which can happen with the propensity score. Moreover, CEM ensures that 
the reweighted control sample matches all of the sample moments of the treated sample, not just 
the means.
31 We chose to use CEM because it appears more robust to misspecification of the 
selection process and because we find the nonparametric exact matching process more intuitive 
than an iterative search for an appropriate specification of the propensity score. However, 
because both CEM and the propensity score rely on the same fundamental assumption that 
selection into treatment is exogenous conditional on observables, the two methods should 
produce similar results when that assumption is correct.  
We use CEM to construct two matched samples: one consisting of green policy adopters 
and their quasi-control group and another consisting of green policy adopter neighbors and their 
quasi-control group. In both cases, our goal is to achieve balance—statistically indistinguishable 
distributions between the treatments and controls—across a set of exogenous covariates that 
might lead to policy adoption, including environmental preferences, market size, and other city-
level demographics.  
To implement CEM, we begin by coarsening Population to create 10 strata.
32 This large 
number of strata (relative to the overall size of the dataset) results in a very close match on the 
size distribution, but leads to a curse of dimensionality (that is, very small samples) if we include 
many additional variables in the matching procedure. Therefore, when we match policy adopter 
cities, we match on Population and Prius Share, for which we assign cut points at the 25th, 50th, 
75th, 90th, and 95th percentiles.
33 Matching on these two variables yields a matched sample of 
26 policy adopting cities and 180 controls. Because the green policy neighbors  sample is 
somewhat larger, we also match on Income, Green Ballot Share, and LCV Senate Score, though 
we use a very coarse match for these additional variables in order to prevent a substantial drop in 
                                                 
31 This property of CEM proved important in our application, where the distribution of city size is highly skewed. 
32 We set cut points at 10, 50, 70, 100, 120, 150, 250, 300, 350, and 470 thousand inhabitants and omit cities above the top 
threshold because there are no suitable controls.  
33 In terms of actual registration rates, the corresponding values are 0.5, 0.8, 1.0, 1.5, and 2.7 percent of all registered vehicles.   20
sample size.
34 We omit green policy adopter cities as potential controls for the sample of green 
policy adopter neighbors. The matching process removes 31 green policy neighbor cities and 324 
potential controls, resulting in a matched sample of 80 green policy adopter neighbor cities and 
291 matched control cities.  
Table 2 illustrates how CEM dramatically improves the balance in the means of 
exogenous covariates across the treatment and control samples. Each row in the table reports 
means for the treatment and control cities in a particular sample and a t-statistic from regressing 
each covariate on the treatment dummy (Green Policy Adopter or Green Policy Adopter 
Neighbor). Panel A of Table 2 compares all cities that adopt a green building policy, excluding 
the four largest, to the full set of potential controls (that is, to all other cities in California) using 
unweighted OLS regressions.
35 We find that cities adopting a green building policy are larger, 
greener, wealthier, and better educated than the potential controls. There is a statistically 
significant difference in the means of each variable except for the per-capita measure of new 
construction activity. 
Panel B of Table 2 compares CEM-weighted means for the matched sample of green 
policy adopters and their controls. These results can be viewed as a falsification test for our 
maintained assumption: If the treatment remains correlated with observables, we might be more 
skeptical of the assumption that it is uncorrelated with unobserved drivers of private LEED 
adoption. Note that matching on Population and Prius Share excludes three cities (Oakland, 
Berkeley, and Ventura) from the treatment group, reducing it to just 26 green building 
procurement policy adopters. Since we used the distributions of Population and Prius Share to 
create the match, by construction we should observe no difference in the means of these 
variables across treatment and control cities. In fact, Panel B of Table 2 shows that matching on 
                                                 
34 For the neighbor-city matching, we leave the Population cut points unchanged. We continue to use the 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th, 
and 95th percentiles of Prius Share, which correspond to registration rates of 0.26, 0.56, 1.21, 1.78, and 2.36 percent of all 
vehicles. Finally, we set cut points at the 25th and 75th percentiles of Income ($44 and $70 thousand) and at the medians of 
Green Ballot Share (67 percent approval) and LCV Senate Score (44 points). 
35 Each of the four largest cities in California (Los Angeles, San Diego, San Jose, and San Francisco) has adopted a green 
building procurement policy. Including these cities in the analysis leads to a dramatic increase in imbalance and a similarly large 
increase in the results presented below.   21
just these two variables eliminates any statistically significant differences in the means of all 
observables. In particular, CEM produces balance for alternative measures of green preferences 
(Alternative Fuel Stations and Solar Projects) and demographic characteristics (College, Income, 
and log(FIRE Employment)) that were not used to construct the match.  
Green policy adopter neighboring cities, too, are larger, greener, wealthier, and better 
educated than all non-adopting cities (that is, all of their potential controls). Indeed, the raw 
means of all exogenous covariates in Table 2 were statistically significantly different between 
the two groups (not shown). CEM matching and reweighting removed significant differences in 
the means of all of these variables, as indicated in Panel C of Table 2. Given more data, we 
might consider adding a number of additional variables to the matching process, particularly for 
the green policy adopter sample. However, the results in Table 2 suggest that we have removed 
much of the potential bias, and we do not wish to further increase the variance of our estimates 
by excluding more observations. 
B. Cross-sectional Analysis 
We begin our empirical analysis with a cross-sectional comparison of cumulative LEED 
registrations between the matched green policy adopter cities and their control cities. 
Specifically, we estimate the following linear regression: 
(1)   Yi = α + β · Exposurei + γ · Xi + εi,  
where Yi is Total Private LEED Registrations in city i as of 2008. Exposurei represents Exposure 
to Policy, the number of years that had elapsed between a city having adopted its green policy 
and 2008, the final year of our sample. X i represents a set of controls for factors potentially 
associated with LEED adoption: environmental preferences (Prius Share, Green Ballot Share, 
LCV Senate Score, and LCV Assembly Score), market size and economic growth (Population, 
Total  New Buildings), educational attainment (College), and wealth (Income).
36 We are 
                                                 
36 Adding controls is not necessary for causal inference, but should increase the precision of our estimates. However, it is worth 
noting that because of the matching procedure, we do not use the control variables to extrapolate potential outcomes to regions of   22
interested in the coefficient  β, which measures the difference in the average annual LEED 
registration rate between Green Policy Adopter cities and their matched controls. Robust 
standard errors are clustered by county to account for the possibility of spatial correlation of 
unknown form. We estimate these models with CEM-weighted OLS regression.
37 
Results are presented in Table 3.
38 Our estimates of the spillover effects of government 
procurement on private-sector demand are presented in Column 1. We find a statistically 
significant increase of 2.1 private-sector LEED registrations per year in cities with a green 
building policy, relative to their matched controls. This represents a 30-percent increase in LEED 
adoption beyond the weighted mean of 7.4 Total Private LEED Registrations.  
To estimate the impact of procurement policies on Total Private LEED Registrations in 
adjacent cities, we estimate a model akin to Equation 1, except that we replace Exposure to 
Policy with Exposure to Neighbor’s Policy and use the matched sample of Green Policy Adopter 
Neighbor cities and their matched controls.
39 This model yields a statistically significant increase 
of 0.15 private LEED registrations per year among neighbors relative to their matched controls 
(Table 3, Column 2). When normalized by the weighted mean baseline Total Private LEED 
Registration rate of 1.3 buildings per year, this translates to a marginal effect of 12 percent. 
These estimates suggest that green building procurement policies produce geographic spillovers 
that influence private-sector LEED adoption in neighboring cities. The results also suggest that 
                                                                                                                                                             
the parameter space where there are very few treated or untreated units. 
37 As stressed in Angrist and Pischke (2009), OLS provides the best linear approximation to the conditional expectation function, 
even though Yi is a count variable. Estimating a model with an exponential conditional expectation function (i.e., Poisson with a 
robust covariance matrix) produces similar results. 
38 As a preliminary step, we estimate this model on Total Government LEED Registrations to verify that municipal government 
green procurement policies actually lead to an increase in government LEED procurement. To construct this variable, we first 
create  Annual  Government LEED Registrations as the count of new nonresidential structures that are owned by a local 
government and that were registered for LEED certification each year. Total Government LEED Registrations is each city’s total 
number of Annual Government LEED Registrations from 2001 to 2008. During that time, the cities in our sample registered 
between 0 and 12 new government buildings, with an average of 0.3 LEED-registered buildings per city. Regressing Total 
Government LEED Registrations on Exposure to Policy indicates that government green procurement policies—as intended—
spur greater municipal green building. We find an average of 0.56 more government LEED registrations per year in cities once 
they have adopted a green building procurement policy, a statistically significant difference compared to their control cities (see 
Table A-2, Column 1). 
39 As a preliminary step, we estimate this model on the number of government LEED registrations. We find an average 23% 
annual increase in neighboring cities that do not themselves adopt a green building procurement policy, compared to the 
government LEED registration growth rates in these neighboring cities’ matched controls (calculated as =0.06 divided by the 
CEM-weighted mean outcome of 0.26 in this matched sample; see Column 2 of Table A-2).    23
the estimates in Column 1 for Green Policy Adopter cities are neither an artifact of preferential 
treatment for green buildings by local zoning or permitting officials, nor an artifact of policy-
adopting cities’ preference for green buildings in their own rental market. 
To examine the impact of government procurement policies on green building input 
markets, we reestimate Equation 1, except that Yi becomes Total LEED Accredited Professionals 
in city i as of 2008. Column 3 shows an annual increase of 9.2 LEED Accredited Professionals in 
green policy adopting cities relative to those cities’ matched controls. This is an increase of 22 
percent over the weighted sample mean and is statistically significant at the 10-percent level.  
Since green building factor markets almost certainly extend beyond the borders of any 
particular municipality, we also estimate the same model using the matched sample of Green 
Policy Adopter Neighbor cities and their controls. Column 4 in Table 3 presents estimates of the 
impact of being a green policy neighbor on the number of LEED Accredited Professionals. We 
find a statistically significant increase of 0.7 LEED Accredited Professionals per year, or roughly 
10 percent of the weighted sample mean. This suggests that the market for architects, 
contractors, consultants, and others with green building capabilities is regional, with spillover 
from policy adopters to neighboring cities. In fact, if we aggregate the outcome variable used in 
Column 2 to examine the impact of green building procurement policies on the number of LEED 
Accredited Professionals in all surrounding municipalities, we find large and statistically 
significant results. However, we focus on city-level outcomes because it ensures a better match 
between the treated and control cities, which by construction of the matching process have a 
similar size distribution. 
The results in Table 3 are robust to a variety of changes in model specification. The 
estimated impact of green procurement policies increases if we use the unmatched sample 
(results not reported), but changes very little if we drop the CEM weights from the OLS models 
(Panel A of Appendix Table A-3) or omit the control variables (not reported). Estimating the 
models via a CEM-weighted Poisson regression with robust standard errors, after taking logs of   24
the explanatory variables, yields the same general insights as our primary model with somewhat 
more statistical precision (Panel B of Table A-3). Finally, we obtain very similar estimates if we 
expand the data to an eight-year balanced panel of cities and estimate pooled cross-sectional 
regressions (with or without CEM weights) of Annual Private LEED Registrations or Annual 
LEED Accredited Professionals on the policy-adoption indicator variables City Adopted Green 
Building Policy and Neighbor Adopted Green Building Policy (unreported).  
C. Panel Data Analysis 
We now exploit the panel nature of our policy-adoption and outcome measures to 
estimate models that compare LEED diffusion in treatment and control cities before and after the 
adoption of a green procurement policy. Specifically, we estimate the following two-way fixed-
effects model over the years 2001 through 2008:  
(2)  Yit = αi + λt + β1 Years-since-adoptionit + γ · Xit + εit, 
where Yit is either Annual Private LEED Registrations or Annual LEED Accredited Professionals 
in city i in year t, αi is a fixed effect that absorbs all observed and unobserved time-invariant city 
characteristics, λt is a set of year dummies, and Xit measures annual nonresidential construction 
starts in city i in year t. When we analyze the focal cities and their controls, Years-since-
adoptionit represents Years Since City Adopted Green Policy. Similarly, when we analyze the 
neighbor cities and their controls, Years-since-adoptionit represents Years Since Neighbor 
Adopted Green Policy. The coefficient β1 measures any trend-change in the rate of LEED 
diffusion following the adoption of a green building procurement policy by policy adopter cities 
or their neighbors. This specification is slightly different from a standard difference-in-
differences regression, which would replace Years-since-adoptionit with the indicator variable 
Adoptionit. However, regressions that allow both a step-change and a trend-change in the LEED 
adoption rate typically find the coefficient on Adoptionit to be statistically insignificant, so we   25
constrain it to equal zero.
40 We estimate Model 2 by CEM-weighted OLS regression
  and 
continue to cluster standard errors at the county level.  
The results of our panel data models are reported in Table 4.We find a substantial but 
statistically insignificant positive trend-change in Annual Private LEED Registrations among 
green policy adopter cities compared to their matched controls (Column 1). For green policy 
adopter neighbors, we find a positive and statistically significant trend-change in Annual Private 
LEED Registrations compared to their matched controls (Column 2). We find a similar pattern of 
results for Annual LEED Accredited Professionals: positive trend-changes that are statistically 
insignificant among focal cities (Columns 3) but statistically significant among our larger 
matched set of neighboring cities (Column 4).  
The estimates in Table 4 are initially somewhat smaller than those in Table 3, but suggest 
that the gap in LEED adoption between cities affected by a green building procurement policy 
and their matched controls increases over time. For example, Column 4 in Table 3 suggests that 
Green-Policy Adopter Neighbor cities generate 0.71 more new LEED Accredited Professionals 
per year than their matched controls following policy adoption, whereas the results of the more 
flexible specification reported in Column 4 in Table 4 suggest that the difference is 0.24 
additional LEED Accredited Professionals in the year the policy is adopted, 0.48 in the second 
year, 0.72 in the third year, and so on.  
These results in Table 4 are robust to several alternative model specifications (reported in 
Appendix Table A-4). Dropping CEM weights yields similar point estimates, but all of the 
coefficients become statistically significant (Panel A in Table A-4). Estimating a CEM-weighted 
model with the outcome in logs indicates, in both the focal city and neighboring city analyses, a 
positive trend-change that is significant at the 10-percent level for three out of the four cases 
(Panel B). Finally, we estimate a first-differenced model, which should alleviate any concern 
about the strict exogeneity assumption associated with conditional fixed effects, and find 
                                                 
40 The only exception to this statement relates to Model 2 in Table 4, where the more flexible specification finds a negative and 
significant step-change, leading us to report a somewhat smaller (i.e., less positive) trend-change in Table 4.   26
somewhat smaller positive trend-changes for both private LEED registrations and LEED 
Accredited Professionals that remain statistically significant for neighbor cities (Panel C).  
Returning to Table 4, the bottom two rows report results of F-tests of the null hypothesis 
that there is no difference in the trends of the outcome variable between treatment and control 
cities prior to the adoption of the green building procurement policy. To implement this test, we 
drop from the estimation sample all observations where Years-since-adoptionit is greater than 
zero, add a new set of indicator variables coded 1 t years before a city i adopts a policy (where t 
equals 1 through 4) and otherwise coded 0, and report an F-test for the joint significance of these 
pre-policy indicators. The F-tests show that there was no difference in pre-policy LEED 
Registration trends, but that real estate professionals in green policy adopter neighbor cities were 
becoming LEED-accredited at a higher rate than that of their matched controls before the 
policies went into effect.
41 This pre-policy trend in LEED accreditation might reflect the fact that 
there is typically some public discussion prior to the adoption of a green building procurement 
policy. Indeed, one interpretation of the results in Tables 3 and 4 is that municipal green building 
policies help solve a coordination problem between developers and green building input 
suppliers by providing a highly visible source of demand. The next subsection considers some of 
the alternative interpretations and mechanisms described above. 
D. Moderating Effects of Awareness and Market Size 
One potential explanation for the findings in Tables 3 and 4 is that developers, 
consumers, and input suppliers were unaware of LEED certification before their municipal 
government adopted a green building policy. If a combination of latent demand and increased 
awareness were driving our results, we would expect to see public green procurement policies 
having a larger impact in cities where there is a higher demand for other green amenities, since a 
greater local willingness-to-pay for environmental amenities would raise the private benefits of 
                                                 
41 Using an alternative hazard specification, we find no significant influence of either cumulative LEED registrations or 
cumulative LEED Accredited Professionals on the adoption of a government green building procurement policy (results available 
upon request).   27
adopting green building practices in these locales (for example, through increased rents and 
occupancy). We explore this idea by estimating cross-sectional OLS models that predict Total 
Private LEED Registrations based on interactions of Exposure to Policy or Exposure to 
Neighbor’s Policy with a city’s average preference for environmental amenities (Prius Share and 
Green Ballot Share) or its demographics (College). In each regression, we demean the 
continuous variable in the interaction, so the main effect of policy adoption can be interpreted as 
an average treatment effect on the treated. 
The results in Table 5 show that Total Private LEED Registrations does not exhibit a 
stronger response to a public green procurement policy in cities with greater Prius Share, 
College, or Green Ballot Share, as compared to cities with lower values of these proxies for 
environmental preference. This finding holds both for green policy adopter cities and their 
matched controls and for green policy adopter neighbors and their matched controls.
 42 As one 
might expect, the main effects of Prius Share and College are positive and statistically 
significant. While the Prius Share interactions are imprecise, the interactions with College and 
Green Ballot Share are essentially zero. LCV Assembly Score and LCV Senate Score also yielded 
precisely estimated zeroes on the interaction term (unreported).
43 Alternative specifications, in 
which we replace the continuous moderators with dummy variables indicating whether or not 
each moderator was above the sample mean, yield the same general pattern of results (see Table 
A-5). Overall, the estimates in Table 5 suggest that public green procurement policies are not 
stimulating latent demand by making consumers, private developers, and suppliers more aware 
that the LEED standard exists. 
                                                 
42 We considered a number of alternative specifications and found qualitatively similar results for unweighted OLS regressions 
with and without controls and for count data specifications (i.e., robust Poisson). While no models indicate that there were more 
Total Private LEED Registrations in policy adopting cities with more pro-environmental voting records, we did find that the 
treatment effect was larger for policy adopters with a high rate of Prius ownership in models where the outcome variable was the 
number of Total Private LEED Registrations per new buildings constructed between 2003 and 2007. 
43 We considered a number of alternative specifications and found qualitatively similar results for unweighted OLS regressions 
with and without controls and for count data specifications (i.e., robust Poisson). While no models suggest that there were more 
LEED Registrations in treated cities with a more pro-environmental voting record, we did find that the treatment effect was larger 
for policy adopters with a high rate of Prius ownership in models for which the outcome variable was the number of LEED 
Registrations per New Building constructed between 2003 and 2007.   28
Another potential explanation for the results in Tables 3 and 4 is that government 
procurement rules lead to lower green building input prices, thereby stimulating private-sector 
adoption. In this scenario, incumbent suppliers reduce their prices either because of a decline in 
average costs (for example, through scale or learning effects) or because more competitors have 
entered the relevant factor markets (Bresnahan and Reiss 1991). One testable implication of this 
hypothesis is that the impact of municipal procurement policies should decline with city size.
44 
Intuitively, private demand for LEED buildings is more likely to cover a supplier’s entry costs in 
large markets, leading to robust competition among suppliers operating at efficient scale. 
Conversely, in large cities with competitive factor markets, the increased demand from a 
municipal procurement policy will have little or no impact on suppliers’ average costs or the 
prices faced by developers.  
We examine whether city size moderates the impact of municipal green procurement 
policies by estimating cross-sectional OLS models of Total LEED Accredited Professionals on 
three measures of market size (log City Population, log County Population and log Total New 
Buildings) interacted with each of our two treatment dummies (Green Policy Adopter and Green 
Policy Adopter Neighbor). The results of these six models, reported in Appendix Table A-6, 
suggest that there is little relationship between market size and the impact of green building 
procurement policy adoption. Specifically, the interaction term was statistically insignificant in 
five of the six models and was positive and significant in the specification in which we interacted 
policy adoption with log(Total New Buildings) for policy adopter cities.
45 Overall, the estimates 
suggest that government green building procurement policies do not stimulate private demand by 
causing incumbent suppliers to lower their prices.  
                                                 
44 One exception is when procurement policies are insufficient to stimulate supplier entry in the smallest markets, leading to a 
non-monotonic prediction that policy effects will be greatest at some intermediate market size (below the level at which private 
demand for green buildings is sufficient to generate robust competition among suppliers).  
45 Once again, the results are qualitatively robust to omitting the CEM weights, using a Poisson specification, or dropping the 
control variables; that is, no specification suggests that the treatment effect declines with city size.   29
E. Indirect Network Effects 
The analyses thus far have estimated the impact of government green procurement policy 
adoption on private-sector green building activity (registrations) and on LEED-specific 
investments in human capital for green building (accredited professionals). We find no evidence 
that these results are driven by increased awareness of LEED in policy adopter cities or by scale 
economies and increased competition among incumbent suppliers. Another possible explanation 
for our main findings is that green building procurement policies break a deadlock among 
specialized input suppliers such as real estate professionals, who are reluctant to invest in LEED 
without evidence of demand for green buildings, and developers, who are reluctant to embark on 
building green until local factor markets have matured. Our final empirical analyses estimate the 
indirect network effects at the heart of this story; that is, the causal impacts of LEED Accredited 
Professionals on LEED registrations and vice versa. Our theory that procurement policies help 
local markets overcome excess inertia implies a positive feedback loop, which requires both of 
these structural parameters to be positive.  
Instrumental variable models. We use instrumental variables to estimate these indirect 
network effect parameters. To identify the impact of Total LEED Accredited Professionals on 
Total Private LEED Registrations, we require an instrument that is correlated with the supply of 
LEED Accredited Professionals but uncorrelated with unobserved drivers of private LEED 
registration. We propose to use government green procurement policy adoption in “distant” cities 
as our instrument. Specifically, we use the log of the number of green policy adopter cities 
between 25 and 50 miles from the center of the focal city to instrument for the number of LEED 
Accredited Professionals in all cities within 25 miles of that focal city. This instrument is 
motivated by the assumption that markets served by building industry professionals are more 
dispersed than both the drivers of municipal procurement policy and the direct impact of green 
building procurement policies. Put differently, we assume that green building procurement 
policies in cities that are 25 to 50 miles away have no impact on developers of private buildings   30
other than through the supply of LEED Accredited Professionals.
46  
To isolate the reverse relationship—the impact of the number of private LEED 
registrations on the number of LEED Accredited Professionals—we require an instrumental 
variable that is correlated with the number of LEED registrations but uncorrelated with 
unobserved drivers of local real estate professionals’ decisions to seek accreditation. Building on 
the instrumental variables strategy used in Corts (2010), we use Total New Buildings (conditional 
on city population, which we control for in the regression) as an instrument for Total Private 
LEED Registrations. Intuitively, as the number of new building starts increases, so does the 
probability of having one or more LEED-registered projects that could induce real estate 
professionals to seek LEED accreditation. Because we condition on Population, the key 
assumption underlying the validity of our instrument is that variation in the intensity of 
development (that is, the number of new buildings per capita within each city) between 2003 and 
2007 will affect the number of private LEED registrations (for example, because of competition 
among developers) without otherwise altering the incentive for real estate professionals to seek 
LEED accreditation. Because the number of new buildings is clearly exogenous to an individual 
real estate professional’s decision to seek LEED accreditation, the main concern with this 
instrument is that omitted variables might be correlated with both building activity and LEED 
accreditation rates. We therefore continue to control for Prius Share and Green Ballot Share to 
account for a city’s green taste. All models also control for Population, Income, and College. 
We estimate our IV regressions on all cities with more than 20,000 residents that did not 
adopt a green building procurement policy. We exclude policy adopter cities because variation in 
neighbor city Accredited Professionals is clearly not exogenous for those cities. We exclude 
cities with fewer than 20,000 residents for comparability to our prior results, where the matching 
process excluded most small and/or rural cities.  
Instrumental variable results. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 report cross-sectional OLS and 
                                                 
46 We used project-level data on construction starts from McGraw Hill to find the median distance between a building site and the 
office address of its architect or general contractor at 28 miles. The 75th percentile of this distribution is roughly 75 miles.   31
IV estimates of the impact of Total LEED Accredited Professionals on Total Private LEED 
Registrations.
47 Column 1 reports OLS estimates of the correlation between the number of LEED 
Accredited Professionals in the cities within 25 miles of a focal city and the number of LEED 
registrations in that focal city. This correlation suggests an increase of 0.29 private LEED 
registrations per log-point increase in the number of LEED Accredited Professionals in the 
surrounding cities. Column 2 presents our IV estimates that use distant policy adoption as an 
instrument for the number of nearby LEED Accredited Professionals. There is a strong first-stage 
correlation between distant cities’ green building policies and the number of LEED Accredited 
Professionals in municipalities surrounding the focal city. In particular, an F-test clearly rejects 
the hypothesis that distant green building policies are uncorrelated with the supply of local 
LEED Accredited Professionals, with an F-statistic (44.5) well above the F=10 rule-of-thumb for 
diagnosing weak instruments (Staiger and Stock 1997). The second-stage IV estimates indicate 
that a one-log-point increase in the number of nearby LEED Accredited Professionals generates 
an additional 0.56 Total Private LEED Registrations as of 2008.
48 This IV coefficient is almost 
twice as large as the corresponding OLS estimate and the second-to-last row in Table 6 indicates 
that we can reject (at the 10-percent-significance level) the hypothesis that the IV and OLS 
estimates are equal. 
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 6 estimate the impact of Total Private LEED Registrations on 
Total LEED Accredited Professionals. OLS results are presented in Column 3 as a baseline. In 
Column 4, we use Total New Buildings as an instrument for Total Private LEED Registrations. 
For this model, we also find a strong first-stage relationship between the instrument and the 
endogenous regressor, with a first-stage F-statistic of 17.7 once again suggesting that we do not 
have a weak-instrument problem.
49 The IV estimates in Column 4 indicate that each private 
                                                 
47 Instrumental variable results for the full sample are reported in Appendix Table A-7. 
48 In an unreported log-log specification, the IV coefficient implies an elasticity of 0.1 and remains statistically significant. 
49 The F-statistics reported in Table 6 are based on cluster-robust standard errors with unspecified county-level correlation. An 
alternative specification that assumes homoskedastic second-stage residuals produces even larger first-stage F-statistics (F=104.1 
and 34.5 for Columns 2 and 4, respectively). In this alternative specification, both second-stage estimates remain significant at 
the 5-percent level, though the standard error on log(Total LEED Accredited Professionals within 25 Miles) in Column 2   32
LEED registration produces three additional LEED Accredited Professionals in the same city.
50 
While the IV estimate in Column 4 is about 42 percent larger than the corresponding OLS 
coefficient, it is also less precise, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the OLS and IV 
estimates are equal.  
The instrumental variable results in Table 6 provide evidence of two positive causal 
relationships operating simultaneously: (1) An increase in the supply of LEED Accredited 
Professionals causes an increase in the number of private LEED registrations and (2) an increase 
in the number of private LEED registrations causes an increase in the number of LEED 
Accredited Professionals. These indirect network effects are a necessary (though not sufficient) 
condition for the existence of a chicken-and-egg dilemma in the adoption of a new quality 
standard.
51 More generally, by showing how distant green procurement policies can influence 
private-sector developers through the supply of nearby LEED Accredited Professionals, these 
results point to the importance of supply-side spillovers in the diffusion of LEED.  
IV. Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper provides evidence that public procurement policies can influence private-
sector purchasing decisions in a way that reinforces underlying policy goals. In particular, we 
show that local-government green-building procurement rules produce spillover effects that 
stimulate both private-sector adoption of the LEED standard by developers and investments in 
green building expertise by local suppliers. These effects are analogous to the same-side and 
cross-side externalities emphasized in the industrial organization literature on technology 
platforms. Moreover, in our context there is a geographic component to these spillover effects, as 
the development of regional input markets stimulates private-sector developers in neighboring 
cities to adopt LEED at a greater rate, even when those neighbor cities do not have their own 
                                                                                                                                                             
increases to 0.28 while the standard error on Total Private LEED Registrations in Column 4 drops to 0.67. 
50 In an unreported log-log specification, the IV coefficient implies an elasticity of 1.24 and remains statistically significant. 
51 Future work using a larger sample of cities might estimate a structural model that explicitly accounts for the possibility of 
multiple equilibria in the adoption process.   33
green building policies. To our knowledge, this the first study to examine whether or not 
government procurement acts as a focal adopter that tips the market towards a particular standard 
or certification scheme, despite this often being a primary stated objective of socially motivated 
government procurement policies such as “buy green” initiatives. 
Another contribution of our study is to suggest a parallel between standards for 
environmental performance and the interoperability standards studied in the industrial 
organization literature on platforms and compatibility. In particular, we find evidence of an 
excess inertia or chicken-and-egg problem—a type of coordination failure typically associated 
with hardware-software platforms—in the diffusion of a new environmental standard, and we 
show how this problem might be overcome if local governments step in as lead users. The 
industrial organization literature describes a variety of alternative ways that a platform manager 
could resolve this type of dilemma; for example, by offering aggressive pricing for a particular 
set of lead users or by supplying its own complements. Future research might focus on cases 
where these alternative strategies were used to promote adoption of different types of 
environmental standards. More generally, understanding how insights into platform creation and 
governance could apply to industry-led efforts to develop environmental standards strikes us as a 
promising research agenda.   
Of course, our analysis is subject to several limitations and boundary conditions, 
discussion of which highlights opportunities for additional research. For example, reinforcing 
spillover effects might be especially likely in our empirical context, since LEED was rapidly 
emerging as the de facto standard for green building certification and many private developers 
could reasonably expect that green building would yield direct economic benefits in the form of 
energy savings and increased demand. Moreover, governments are especially large customers in 
the construction services sector. Further research is needed to examine the extent to which public 
procurement rules influence private purchasing in mature markets where governments account 
for a smaller share of total demand.    34
Another caveat is that we do not measure the environmental performance implications of 
increased LEED adoption. While engineering studies suggest that LEED certification is 
correlated with increased energy efficiency, future research might examine the environmental 
impact of public green building policies.  
Finally, since our findings suggest that government procurement policies can catalyze the 
adoption of a privately developed certification scheme, one might ask whether governments 
typically choose the “right” standard? In the case of LEED, it is not clear whether (a) municipal 
green building policies promoted lock-in to a particular standard (the leading alternative was the 
EPA’s Energy Star label) or (b) increasing returns simply led private and public actors to 
coalesce around the most popular measurement system at the time. Nevertheless, our LEED 
accreditation results show that government purchasing policies can promote standard-specific 
investments by various third parties, such as architects, contractors, and suppliers of green 
building materials. This both points to procurement policies as an effective policy tool and 
highlights the potential dangers of lock-in to a government-selected standard, particularly if it 
was developed by firms hoping to preempt more stringent regulation. The question of how 
government should be involved in the ex ante development of voluntary standards that might 
later provide the basis for procurement policies is another intriguing topic for future research. 
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Figure 1. LEED Accredited Professionals by Occupation in California in 2010 
 
 
 
 
Note: Based on data provided by the Green Building Certification Institute. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable name  Definition  Mean SD Min  Max 
Panel A: City-level Variables           
Total Private LEED Registrations  Total private LEED-registered buildings during 2001-2008   1.64 5.57 0.0 87.0
Total Private LEED Registrations per Capita  Total private LEED-registered buildings during 2001-2008 / City population in 10,000s 0.84 4.72 0.0 82.0
Total LEED Accredited Professionals   Total LEED Accredited Professionals during 2001-2008  7.51 27.38 0.0 416.0
Total LEED Accredited Professionals per Capita  Total LEED Accredited Professionals during 2001-2008 / City population in 10,000s 2.38 8.50 0.0 163.9
Total Government LEED Registrations   Total government LEED-registered buildings during 2001-2008  0.29 0.94 0.0 12.0
Total Government LEED Registrations per Capita Total government LEED-registered buildings during 2001-2008 / City population in 10,000s 0.09 0.50 0.0 7.6
Green Policy Adopter   Focal city adopted green building policy by 2008 (dummy)  0.04 0.19 0.0 1.0
Green Policy Adopter Neighbor   Focal city borders a city that adopted green building policy by 2008 (dummy)  0.15 0.36 0.0 1.0
Exposure to Policy  Years elapsed by 2008 since focal city adopted green building policy   0.13 0.74 0.0 8.0
Exposure to Neighbor’s Policy  Years elapsed by 2008 since neighbor city adopted green building policy   0.74 1.95 0.0 8.0
Prius Share  Toyota Prius as percent of all car registrations in 2008 (x 100)  0.54 0.59 0.0 3.7
Green Ballot Share  Percent of votes in favor of green ballot measures  60.73 14.76 19.9 100.0
LCV Senate Score  League of Conservation Voters score in 2001 of the city’s State Senate representatives   39.31 42.16 0.0 100.0
LCV Assembly Score  League of Conservation Voters score in 2001 of the city’s State Assembly representatives 40.55 42.02 0.0 100.0
Population  City population in 2000 (10,000s)  2.99 5.10 0.0 46.2
Total New Buildings  Total nonresidential construction starts during 2003-2007  26.21 54.71 0.0 869.0
Total New Buildings per Capita  Total nonresidential construction starts during 2003-2007 / City population in 10,000s  12.06 18.42 0.0 204.0
College Percent  college-educated in 2000  23.01 16.59 0.6 89.4
Income  Median household income in 2000 ($10,000s)  4.80 2.17 0.0 20.0
Log(Employment) Employment  in  all SICs in 2001  8.07 2.06 0.0 13.9
Log(FIRE Employment)  Employment in Finance, Insurance & Real Estate SICs in 2001  4.89 2.50 0.0 11.41
Alternative Fuel Stations  Number of alternative-fuel filling stations in 2003  0.17 0.66 0.0 8.0
Solar Projects   Number of residential, commercial, and government solar installations by 2006  0.12 0.53 0.0 8.0
Panel B: City-year Variables        
Annual Private LEED Registrations  New private LEED-registered buildings this year   0.20 1.32 0.0 52.0
Annual Government LEED Registrations  New government LEED-registered buildings this year  0.04 0.24 0.0 6.0
Annual LEED Accredited Professionals  New LEED Accredited Professionals this year  0.94 5.21 0.0 160.0
City Adopted Green Policy   Focal city adopted policy by this year  0.02 0.13 0.0 1.0
Neighbor Adopted Green Policy   Neighbor city adopted policy by this year  0.09 0.29 0.0 1.0
Years Since City Adopted Green Policy  Years since focal city adopted procurement policy  0.03 0.27 0.0 4.0
Years Since Neighbor Adopted Green Policy  Years since neighbor city adopted procurement policy  0.25 0.90 0.0 4.0
Annual New Buildings  Nonresidential construction starts this year  5.90 12.90 0.0 208.7
Annual New Buildings per Capita  Nonresidential construction starts this year / City population in 10,000s  2.74 7.04 0.0 200.0
Notes: Panel A provides summary statistics for a cross-section of 735 California cities. Panel B reports annual variables for 5,880 city-year observations. Both panels exclude Los 
Angeles, San Diego, San Jose, and San Francisco. 
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Table 2. Covariate Balance in Full and Matched Samples 
   Panel A    Panel B     Panel C 
 Sample  Full sample    Green policy adopter 
cities and matched 
controls 
   Green policy adopter 
neighboring cities and 
matched controls 
 Weighting  No weights    Weighted     Weighted 
 Green 
policy 
adopters 
All non-
adopters
t-stat Green 
policy 
adopters
Matched 
controls
 t-stat   Green 
policy 
adopter 
neighbors  
Matched 
controls 
t-stat
Prius Share  0.93  0.53  3.62 0.86 0.80  0.41    0.71  0.72  0.05
Green Ballot Share  72.26  60.25  4.35 71.08 68.27 1.09    68.08  65.98  1.36
LCV Senate Score  63.03   38.29  3.12 63.00 51.64 0.95    61.00  62.33  0.21
LCV Assembly Score  64.97  39.32  3.25 60.92 58.12 0.26    57.11  56.85   0.04
Alternative Fuel Stations   0.90  0.14  6.23 0.96 0.85  0.27    0.10  0.15  0.96
Solar Projects   0.86  0.09  7.96 0.96 0.74  0.71    0.07  0.08  0.02
Population 14.36  2.53  13.68 13.70 13.51 0.06   3.86  3.71  0.33
Total New Buildings  140.79  21.59  12.64 139.77 109.53  0.78   25.94  31.26  1.01
Total New Buildings per Capita  10.62  12.20  0.45 10.83  9.98  0.49    10.22  9.73  0.25
College 35.24  22.50  4.09 34.53 34.17 0.10    31.06  29.85  0.39
Income 5.58  4.77  1.97 5.70 5.83  0.33    5.98  6.04  0.12
Log(Employment) 10.97  7.96  8.05 10.92 10.68 0.94   9.25  9.00  1.29
Log(FIRE Employment)  8.22  4.76  7.57 8.19 8.15  0.11    6.44  6.13  1.22
Cities  29 697   26 180     80  291  
 
Notes: Unit of analysis is a city. Panel A reports means of each variable and t-statistic from unweighted OLS 
regression of the variable on Green Policy Adopter dummy. Panels B and C report CEM-weighted means of each 
variable and the t-statistic from CEM-weighted OLS regression of the variable on Green Policy Adopter dummy 
(middle panel) or Green Policy Adopter Neighbor dummy (right panel).  CEM weights are described in Iacus, King, 
and Porro (2012) and discussed in the text. T-statistics corresponding to p < 10% are in boldface. 
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Table 3. Effects of Green Building Procurement Policies on LEED Registrations and 
Accredited Professionals: Cross-sectional Regression Results 
Sample  Green policy 
adopter cities and 
matched controls 
Green policy 
adopter 
neighboring cities
and matched 
controls 
Green policy 
adopter cities and 
matched controls 
Green policy 
adopter 
neighboring cities
and matched 
controls 
Outcome  Total Private LEED Registrations    Total LEED Accredited Professionals 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Exposure to Policy   2.11    9.17   
    [0.69]***    [4.75]*   
Exposure to Neighbor’s Policy    0.15    0.71 
       [0.07]**   [0.29]** 
Observations  (cities)  206 371  206 371 
CEM-weighted mean outcome  7.36  1.28  40.81  7.20 
R-squared  0.56 0.28  0.39 0.41 
Notes: CEM-weighted OLS regression coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered by county in brackets; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Unit of analysis is a city; see Table 2 for the number of treated and control units in the 
matched samples. All models also control for Prius Share, Total New Buildings, Population, College, Income, 
Green Ballot Share, LCV Senate Score, and LCV Assembly Score.  
 
Table 4. Effects of Green Building Procurement Policies on LEED Registrations and 
Accredited Professionals: City Fixed-effects Regression Results 
 
Sample  Green policy adopter 
cities and matched 
controls 
Green policy adopter 
neighboring cities
and matched 
controls 
  Green policy adopter 
cities and matched 
controls 
Green policy adopter 
neighboring cities
and matched 
controls 
Outcome  Annual Private LEED Registrations   Annual LEED Accredited 
Professionals 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Years Since City Adopted Green Policy  1.13    3.63   
      [0.73]   [2.29]  
Years Since Neighbor Adopted Green Policy   0.05    0.24 
       [0.02]**   [0.08]*** 
Weighted avg. outcome  0.92  0.16  5.08  0.90 
Observations  (city-years)  1672 2968  1672 2968 
Cities  209 371  209 371 
R-squared  0.31 0.16  0.48 0.31 
F-test for pre-policy trend differences 
F-statistic  0.30 1.72  0.53 2.88 
P  value  0.87 0.16  0.71 0.03 
Notes: CEM-weighted OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered by county in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10. Unit of analysis is a city-year. All models also include city fixed effects and year fixed effects and 
control for Annual New Buildings. 
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Table 5. Effects of Green Building Procurement Policy Interacted with Green 
Demographics on LEED Registrations 
Sample  Green policy 
adopter cities 
and matched 
controls 
Green policy 
adopter 
neighboring 
cities and 
matched 
controls 
Green policy 
adopter cities 
and matched 
controls 
Green policy 
adopter 
neighboring 
cities and 
matched 
controls 
Green 
policy 
adopter 
cities and 
matched 
controls 
Green policy 
adopter 
neighboring 
cities and 
matched 
controls 
Outcome Total  Private  LEED Registrations 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Exposure to Policy  2.11    1.91    2.12   
 [1.05]*    [0.90]**    [0.91]**  
Exposure to Neighbor’s Policy    0.14    0.14    0.13 
   [0.06]**    [0.06]**    [0.05]** 
Exposure to Policy  Prius Share  -0.50           
 [0.69]           
Exposure to Neighbor’s Policy  Prius Share   0.22        
      [0.15]         
Exposure to Policy  College     0.03       
     [0.05]       
Exposure to Neighbor’s Policy  College       0.00    
          [0.00]     
Exposure to Policy  Green Ballot Share          0.02   
            [0.06]   
Exposure to Neighbor’s Policy  Green Ballot Share           0.00 
              [0.00] 
Prius Share  6.83  0.59         
 [1.26]***  [0.17]***        
College     0.25  0.02     
     [0.03]*** [0.01]***     
Green Ballot Share          0.20  0.02 
         [0.15]  [0.02] 
Total New Buildings  0.06  0.03  0.06  0.03  0.04  0.03 
 [0.02]***  [0.01]*** [0.02]*** [0.01]***  [0.02]*  [0.01]***
Observations (cities)  209  371  209  371  206  371 
R-squared 0.42  0.28  0.45  0.26  0.36  0.22 
Notes: CEM-weighted OLS regression coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered by county in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10. Unit of analysis is a city. Prius Share, College, and Green Ballot Share are demeaned when included in 
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Table 6. OLS and IV Estimates of Indirect Network Effects  
Sample  Cities without a green building procurement policy 
and with population > 20,000 
Outcome  Total Private LEED 
Registrations 
Total LEED Accredited 
Professionals 
Estimation  OLS IV  OLS IV 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
log(Total of LEED Accredited Professionals   0.29  0.56     
   within 25 miles)  [0.12]**  [0.20]***     
Total Private LEED Registrations      2.15  3.06 
     [0.19]***  [1.37]*** 
  First-stage coefficients and statistics 
log(Number of cities with green policy within 25     1.21     
  to 50 miles in 2008)    [0.18]***     
Total New Buildings        0.04 
       [0.01]*** 
       
F-test of excluded IVs    44.53***    17.72*** 
       
Observations  (cities)  244 244    244 244 
Endogeneity test (p-value)    0.08    0.49 
R-squared  0.43 0.42    0.50 0.46 
 
Notes: OLS and instrumental variable regressions, with robust standard errors clustered by county in brackets;  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Unit of analysis is a city. All models include controls for Prius Share, Green 
Ballot Share, Population, College, and Income. Models 1 and 2 also control for Total New Buildings. Null 
hypothesis for endogeneity test is exogeneity of endogenous regressor.Appendix - 1 
APPENDIX 
 
Table A-1. California Cities with a Green Building Policy by 2008 
  City   In matched 
sample 
Population 
(10,000s) 
1  Los Angeles  No  369.49 
2  San Diego  No  122.34 
3  San Jose  No  89.50 
4  San Francisco  No  77.67 
5  Long Beach  Yes  46.15 
6  Sacramento Yes  40.70 
7  Oakland No  39.95 
8  Anaheim Yes  32.80 
9  Stockton Yes  24.38 
10  Fremont Yes  20.34 
11  Glendale Yes  19.50 
12  Santa Clarita  Yes  15.07 
13  Santa Rosa  Yes  14.76 
14  Irvine Yes  14.31 
15  Sunnyvale Yes  13.18 
16  Corona Yes  12.50 
17  Costa Mesa  Yes  10.87 
18  Berkeley No  10.27 
19  Santa Clara  Yes  10.24 
20  Ventura No  10.09 
21  Richmond Yes  9.92 
22  Santa Barbara  Yes  9.23 
23  Santa Monica  Yes  8.41 
24  San Leandro  Yes  7.95 
25  Carlsbad Yes  7.82 
26  Livermore Yes  7.33 
27  Alameda Yes  7.23 
28  Temecula Yes  5.77 
29  La Mesa  Yes  5.47 
30  Cupertino Yes  5.05 
31  West Hollywood  Yes  3.57 
32  Dublin Yes  3.00 
33  Cotati Yes  0.65 
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Table A-2. Effects of Green Building Procurement Policies on Government LEED 
Registrations: Cross-sectional Regression Results 
Sample  Green policy adopter cities and 
matched controls 
Green policy adopter neighboring 
cities and matched controls 
Outcome  Total Government LEED Registrations 
  (1) (2) 
Exposure to Policy   0.56   
    [0.22]**   
Exposure to Neighbor’s Policy    0.06 
   [0.02]** 
Observations (cities)  206  371 
CEM-weighted mean outcome  0.93  0.26 
R-squared 0.41  0.16 
Notes: CEM-weighted OLS regression coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered by county in brackets; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Unit of analysis is a city; see Table 2 for the number of treated and control units in the 
matched samples. All models also control for Prius Share, Total New Buildings, Population, College, Income, 
Green Ballot Share, LCV Senate Score, and LCV Assembly Score.  
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Table A-3. Effects of Green Building Procurement Policies on LEED Registrations and 
Accredited Professionals: Cross-sectional Robustness Test Regression Results 
 
Sample  Green policy 
adopter cities 
and matched 
controls 
Green policy 
adopter 
neighboring 
cities 
and matched 
controls 
Green policy 
adopter cities 
and matched 
controls 
Green policy 
adopter 
neighboring 
cities 
and matched 
controls 
  Panel A: Unweighted OLS Regressions 
Outcome: Total  Private   
LEED Registrations 
Total LEED  
Accredited Professionals 
  (A1) (A2)  (A3) (A4) 
Exposure to Policy   1.97    9.97   
    [0.67]***    [3.99]**   
Exposure to Neighbor’s Policy    0.16    0.66 
   [0.07]**   [0.27]** 
Observations  (cities)  206 371  206 371 
Unweighted mean outcome  4.05  0.83  17.95  4.48 
R-squared  0.64 0.34  0.63 0.38 
  Panel B: Weighted Poisson Regressions 
Outcome:  Total Private  
LEED Registrations 
Total LEED  
Accredited Professionals 
  (B1) (B2)  (B3) (B4) 
Exposure to Policy   0.16    0.14   
    [0.04]***    [0.04]***   
Exposure to Neighbor’s Policy    0.08    0.09 
   [0.04]**   [0.03]*** 
Observations  (cities)  206 371  206 371 
CEM-weighted mean outcome  7.36  1.28  40.81  7.20 
 
Notes: Figures are regression coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered by county in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.10. All models include controls for Prius Share, Total New Buildings, College, Income, Green Ballot Share, LCV Senate 
Score, and LCV Assembly Score; for Panel B, these are included in log form (log after adding 1). Unit of analysis is a city. Appendix - 4 
Table A-4.  Effects of Green Building Procurement Policies on LEED Registrations and 
Accredited Professionals: Robustness Tests 
Sample  Green policy 
adopter cities 
and matched 
controls 
Green policy 
adopter 
neighboring 
cities 
and matched 
controls 
Green policy 
adopter cities  
and matched 
controls 
Green policy 
adopter 
neighboring 
cities 
and matched 
controls 
  Panel A: Unweighted OLS Regressions 
Outcome:  Annual Private  
LEED Registrations   
Annual LEED  
Accredited Professionals 
  (A1) (A2)  (A3) (A4) 
Years Since City Adopted Green Policy   1.50    5.77   
  [0.69]**   [2.41]**  
Years Since Neighbor Adopted Green Policy     0.09    0.42 
   [0.02]***   [0.11]*** 
Observations  (city-years)  1672 2968  1672 2968 
Cities  209 371  209 371 
Mean  outcome  0.50 0.10  2.22 0.56 
R-squared  0.24 0.13  0.32 0.20 
  Panel B: Weighted OLS Regressions 
Outcome:  Log Annual Private  
LEED Registrations   
Log Annual LEED  
Accredited Professionals 
  (B1) (B2)  (B3) (B4) 
Years Since City Adopted Green Policy   0.12    0.06   
 [0.06]*    [0.05]   
Years Since Neighbor Adopted Green Policy     0.02    0.03 
   [0.01]**   [0.02]* 
Observations  (city-years)  1672 2968  1672 2968 
Cities  209 371  209 371 
CEM-weighted mean outcome  0.33  0.09  1.01  0.34 
R-squared  0.55 0.22  0.70 0.44 
  Panel C: Weighted OLS First-differenced Regressions 
Outcome:  Annual Private  
LEED Registrations   
Annual LEED  
Accredited Professionals 
  (C1) (C2)  (C3) (C4) 
City Adopted Green Policy   0.78    3.29   
 [0.76]    [1.92]*   
Neighbor Adopted Green Policy     0.06    0.25 
   [0.02]**   [0.11]** 
Observations  (city-years)  1463 2597  1463 2597 
Cities  209 371  209 371 
CEM-weighted mean outcome  0.50  0.09  2.91  0.55 
R-squared  0.12 0.04  0.35 0.17 
Notes: OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered by county in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.10. Unit of analysis is a city-year. All models control for Annual New Buildings and include year fixed effects. 
All models in Panel A include city fixed effects but do not include CEM weights. All models in Panel B are 
estimated on log dependent variables and include city fixed effects and CEM weights. All models in Panel C are 
estimated using first-differences of the dependent variable and Annual New Buildings and include CEM weights.  
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Table A-5. Effects of Green Building Procurement Policy Interacted with Green 
Demographics on LEED Registrations: Robustness Tests 
Sample  Green policy 
adopter cities 
and matched 
controls 
Green policy 
adopter 
neighboring 
cities and 
matched 
controls 
Green 
policy 
adopter 
cities and 
matched 
controls 
Green policy 
adopter 
neighboring 
cities and 
matched 
controls 
Green 
policy 
adopter 
cities and 
matched 
controls 
Green policy 
adopter 
neighboring 
cities and 
matched 
controls 
Outcome Total  Private  LEED Registrations 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Exposure to Policy  4.18    3.42    2.72   
 [1.54]**    [1.45]**    [1.28]**  
Exposure to Neighbor’s Policy    0.08    0.06    0.09 
   [0.02]***   [0.03]**    [0.07] 
Exposure to Policy  Prius Share above sample median  -2.71         
 [1.91]           
Exposure to Neighbor’s Policy  Prius Share above    0.13        
   sample median    [0.11]         
Exposure to Policy  College above sample median     -1.84       
     [1.57]       
Exposure to Neighbor’s Policy  College above        0.14    
   sample median        [0.12]     
Exposure to Policy  Green Ballot Share above          -0.69   
   sample median          [1.56]   
Exposure to Neighbor’s Policy  Green Ballot Share            0.09 
   above sample median            [0.15] 
Prius Share above sample median  7.47  0.84         
 [1.66]***  [0.19]***        
College above sample median      7.15  0.74     
     [1.90]*** [0.16]***     
Green Ballot Share above sample median          3.34  0.49 
         [2.70]  [0.35] 
Total New Buildings  0.06  0.02  0.06  0.02  0.05  0.03 
 [0.02]***  [0.01]*** [0.02]*** [0.01]***  [0.02]** [0.01]***
Observations (cities)  209  371  209  371  209  371 
R-squared 0.42  0.25  0.41  0.24  0.34  0.22 
Notes: CEM-weighted OLS regression coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered by county in brackets; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Unit of analysis is a city.  
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Table A-6. Effects of Green Building Procurement Policy Interacted with City Size on 
LEED Accredited Professionals 
 
Sample  Green policy adopter cities and 
matched controls 
  Green policy adopter neighboring 
cities and matched controls 
Outcome    Total LEED Accredited Professionals 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Exposure to Policy  3.62  11.36  -3.48         
  [4.02] [8.37] [6.29]         
Exposure to Policy  log(City Population)  8.66          
  [5.72]          
Exposure to Policy  log(County Population)   0.75          
   [3.98]           
Exposure to Policy  log(Total New Buildings)     13.86       
     [6.60]**       
Exposure to Neighbor’s Policy          0.85  0.96  0.31 
        [0.37]**  [0.66]  [0.18]* 
Exposure to Neighbor’s Policy  log(City Population)        -0.24    
        [ 0 . 2 3 ]     
Exposure to Neighbor’s Policy  log(County Population)          -0.14   
          [ 0 . 2 8 ]    
Exposure to Neighbor’s Policy  log(Total New Buildings)           0.43 
           [ 0 . 3 3 ]  
log(City  Population)  7.05       2.51    
 [2.21]***        [0.94]**     
log(County Population)    3.34        -0.35   
   [3.76]       [0.92]   
log(Total New Buildings)      10.93        3.92 
     [4.30]**       [1.27]*** 
Observations  (cities)  209 209 209  371 371 371 
R-squared  0.20 0.10 0.36  0.07 0.02 0.18 
Notes: CEM-weighted OLS coefficients, with robust standard errors clustered by county in brackets; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.10. Unit of analysis is a city. Population and Total New Buildings are demeaned when included in interaction terms. 
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Table A-7. OLS and IV Estimates of Indirect Network Effects (All Cities) 
 
Sample  All cities without green procurement policy 
Outcome  Total Private LEED 
Registrations 
Total LEED Accredited 
Professionals 
Estimation  OLS IV  OLS IV 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
log(Total of LEED Accredited Professionals   0. 10  0. 12     
within 25 miles)  [0.05]*  [0.07]*     
Total Private LEED Registrations      2.31  3.06 
     [0.18]***  [1.08]*** 
  First-stage coefficients and statistics 
log(Number of cities with green policy within 25 to     1.29     
50 miles in 2008)    [0.13]***     
Total New Buildings        0.04 
       [0.01]*** 
       
F-test of excluded IVs    97.17***    17.70*** 
       
Observations  (cities)  697 697    697 697 
Endogeneity test (p-value)    0.66    0.46 
R-squared  0.38 0.38    0.54 0.52 
 
Notes: OLS and instrumental variable regressions, with robust standard errors clustered by county in brackets; *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Unit of analysis is a city. All models include controls for Prius Share, Green Ballot 
Share, Population, College, and Income. Models 1 and 2 also control for Total New Buildings. Null hypothesis for 
endogeneity test is exogeneity of endogenous regressor.
 
 